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ABSTRACT
One of the most central and novel features of the new climate governance architecture
emerging from the 2015 Paris Agreement is the transparency framework committing
countries to provide, inter alia, regular progress reports on national pledges to
address climate change. Many countries will rely on public policies to turn their
pledges into action. This article focuses on the EU’s experience with monitoring
national climate policies in order to understand the challenges that are likely to arise
as the Paris Agreement is implemented around the world. To do so, the research
employs – for the first time – comparative empirical data submitted by states to the
EU’s monitoring system. Our findings reveal how the EU’s predominantly technical
interpretation of four international reporting quality criteria – an approach borrowed
from reporting on GHG fluxes – has constrained knowledge production and stymied
debate on the performance of individual climate policies. Key obstacles to more
in-depth reporting include not only political concerns over reporting burdens and
costs, but also struggles over who determines the nature of climate policy monitoring,
the perceived usefulness of reporting information, and the political control that policy
knowledge inevitably generates. Given the post-Paris drive to achieve greater
transparency, the EU’s experience offers a sobering reminder of the political and
technical challenges associated with climate policy monitoring, challenges that are
likely to bedevil the Paris Agreement for decades to come.
Policy relevance
The 2009 Copenhagen summit ushered in a more bottom-up system of international
climate governance. Such systems typically depend on strong monitoring approaches
to assess past performance and estimate future national contributions over time. This
article shows why decision makers at multiple governance levels should pay serious
attention to empirical data on the experiences and challenges that have emerged
around monitoring in the EU, a self-proclaimed climate leader. The analysis highlights
key political and administrative challenges that policy makers will likely encounter in
implementing climate policy monitoring and ensuring transparency in the spirit of the
Paris Agreement.
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Introduction
The 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) marked a shift towards a more bottom-up form of climate govern-
ance (Jordan et al., 2015), through which countries make emission reduction pledges known as Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions (NDCs). A key component of the Agreement is a ‘transparency framework’ (Article 13) to
ensure tracking of the measures that countries undertake to honour their pledges. As national public policies
will be important in implementing NDCs, the demand for knowledge about past and anticipated climate
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policy effects is growing fast. This requires monitoring, which is often understood as the routine collection of
data on specific indicators of policy performance (Dahler-Larsen, 2011, p. 65; OECD, 2002).
While many scholars argue that in-depth climate policy monitoring and subsequent reporting to higher level
entities (such as the UN) should play an important role after Paris (Aldy & Pizer, 2015; Aldy, Pizer, & Akimoto,
2016; Fransen & Cronin, 2013; Oberthür, 1999; Ostrom, 2014; Purdon, 2015; Steinbacher & Schoenefeld, 2015;
Vezirgiannidou, 2009), it is too often forgotten that the two have always been deeply problematic in practice
(Aldy, 2014; Bodansky, 1993; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011; Thompson, 2006; Yamin & Depledge, 2004,
p. 108). In the early 1990s, developing countries opposed a ‘strong’ monitoring system under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) because they feared that developed countries
would quickly control it (Bodansky, 1993). Two decades later, monitoring was ‘one of the most contentious
issues’ at the Copenhagen summit (Niederberger & Kimble, 2011, p. 47 – emphasis in original).
Few scholars have analysed existing climate policy monitoring systems to understand the political and tech-
nical challenges that have emerged and are likely to persist in the future. Therefore, this article explores the chal-
lenges that the Paris Agreement’s transparency framework is likely to encounter. It does so by drawing on a
detailed and original empirical analysis of the EU’s existing, but little studied, system for monitoring national
climate policies. The EU is worthy of deeper analysis because its system is perhaps the most mature in situ
example of the bottom-up monitoring of national climate policies and measures in existence.1 While the EU
exhibits some features of a state-like system of supranational governance, its climate policy monitoring
system is similar to the country-by-country reporting provided for in the Paris Agreement. These similarities
make the EU an apt (but by no means unproblematic) source of lessons for the evolving international regime.
The remainder of this article unfolds as follows. The second section describes the emergence and key
elements of the Monitoring Mechanism. The EU has repeatedly upgraded its monitoring system, which
emerged in 1993 and at first focused on monitoring GHGs (Haigh, 1996). A focus on policies and measures –
on which this article centres – only emerged in the late 2000s.2 Our analysis focuses on the challenges that
have emerged as the EU has tried to construct a monitoring system that generates complete, consistent, com-
parable, and transparent data on climate policies. These reporting quality criteria3 derive from international
negotiations4 and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidance (1996). They are also directly
informed by academic thinking on comparative policy analysis (e.g. Purdon, 2015), policy monitoring and evalu-
ation (e.g. Schwartz & Mayne, 2005), and transparency (e.g. Gupta, 2010).
The third section explores how far these four criteria are reflected in the EU’s Monitoring Mechanism.
Although the mechanism regularly produces data, to our knowledge no longitudinal academic analyses of its
outputs on policy monitoring have been produced. In our analysis, we therefore draw on, for the first time,
the first three available quantitative data sets (from 2009, 2011, and 2013),5 as well as qualitative reporting docu-
ments submitted by each country. We also consulted a range of published documents and other primary
sources related to the Monitoring Mechanism, including minutes of committee meetings, as well as debates
in the European Parliament. And we conducted interviews with five European Environment Agency (EEA)
staff, who have been closely involved in the design and operation of the Mechanism. The fourth section presents
our discussion and conclusions.
The EU’s Monitoring Mechanism
The roots of EU climate policy monitoring lie in the UNFCCC. Following an EU proposal, ‘regular reporting…
[became] the backbone of the climate change regime’ (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 327). At the time, negotiat-
ing parties agreed to focus on ex ante (i.e. forward-looking) estimates of policy effects as the ‘main goal should
be to help parties come into compliance with the Convention rather than to adjudicate blame or impose sanc-
tions’ (Bodansky, 1993, p. 451).
As a signatory of the UNFCCC, the EU duly created an EU Monitoring Mechanism in 1993 in order to compile
annual data on GHG emissions. Much later (in the late 2000s), the Mechanism also started politically more sen-
sitive monitoring of individual policies (Haigh, 1996; Hildén, Jordan, & Rayner, 2014; Hyvarinen, 1999). The
system is, like the UNFCCC, essentially bottom-up in the sense that states collect data on policy effects and
then submit them to the European Commission. The 1993 Council Decision established a technical committee
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consisting of representatives of Member States to assist the Commission (renamed the ‘Climate Change Commit-
tee’ [CCC] in 2004) in developing the implementation of the climate policies, includingmonitoring. However, there
are some hierarchical elements: the European Commission can legally enforce the submission of reports.6 Indeed,
in 2007 and 2009, the European Court of Justice found Luxembourg to be in breach of its reporting obligations
(Farmer, 2012).7
In practice, the EEA runs the Monitoring Mechanism. The EEA’s role is potentially sensitive as some in the EU
wish to see it focus only on data collection, whereas others emphasize the importance of it taking on more
analytical and evaluative roles (see Martens, 2010). EEA staff stressed that by engaging in policy monitoring
activities, the Agency gains political capital to carry out more sensitive evaluations.8 Several studies have
noted problems with data quality earlier (European Commission, 2003; Farmer, 2012; Gupta & Ringius, 2001;
Wettestad, 2000).9 However, to gain a deeper understanding of monitoring challenges, one should also look
into how these inescapably political and technical aspects interact.
The challenges of monitoring climate policies in practice
This section explores how the EU has interpreted each of the aforementioned quality criteria, how its interpret-
ation has affected data outputs, and which alternatives to the status quo have (not) been considered.
Completeness
The Monitoring Mechanism’s Quality Assurance and Quality Control procedure (EEA, 2013, p. 9), as informed by
the IPCC (1996), states that:
Completeness means that information is reported for all national policies implemented in response to [EU] policies. For each
specific policy, all mandatory information should be reported as specified in the […] reporting guidelines, including infor-
mation on the affected gases, sectors and instrument types. Completeness also means full geographic coverage of policies
and measures […].
At least in principle, the Monitoring Mechanism should generate both ex ante (forward-looking predictions) and
ex post (backward-looking) monitoring data. However, while EU law requires quantitative ex ante estimates, ex
post quantitative estimates are only recommended as per a UNFCCC precedent (see Bodansky, 1993; Hildén
et al., 2014). An EEA report found that the 2011 submissions were relatively complete (ETC/ACC, 2012).
However, the interpretation of this criterion does not encourage Member States to submit ex post data. As
Hildén et al. (2014, p. 898) note, ‘[…] less than 10% of the entries in the 2011 reporting cycle included [ex
post] quantitative data […]’. Our own, much fuller, analysis suggests that this proportion has hardly increased;
ex post estimates only grew slightly from 0% (2009) to 5% (2011), and 5% (2013).10 By contrast, the share of
quantitative ex ante estimates grew over time: Member States reported ex ante estimates on average on 43%
of the policies reported in the Monitoring Mechanism in 2009, 53% in 2011, and 65% in 2013. According to
the EEA, it is likely that ex post estimations will remain rare.11
Member States have often fiercely resisted efforts to insert additional reporting requirements into the Moni-
toring Mechanism. For example, the Commission was forced to accept a softening of its proposals to reform the
2004 Regulation governing the Monitoring Mechanism (e.g. information is only to be provided ‘where available’
– Hildén et al., 2014, p. 889). Our interviews revealed that the perceived ‘administrative burden’ of monitoring is
one important argument behind Member States’ reluctance. According to the EEA, Member States were particu-
larly concerned about reporting costs12 and insisted that the revised Monitoring Mechanism Regulation should
not lead to additional reporting burdens.13 In fact, the latest regulation (revised in 2013) now specifically
addresses this in preamble 12/13.
But is such a strong emphasis on costs justified? The Commission’s impact assessment of the new regulation
estimated that administrative costs were around one million Euros p.a., with 300,000 Euros in additional one-off
set-up costs (European Commission, 2011, p. 46). This estimate does not include the actual costs of producing
and submitting the monitoring data, which are borne by the Member States. While Member States do not reveal
the full costs of policy reporting, costs alone cannot fully explain the resistance to ex post monitoring.
CLIMATE POLICY 3
The EU’s Monitoring Mechanism thus illustrates that there are many obstacles to completeness. Tensions
over cost and political control have prevented the EU from moving beyond the UNFCCC’s relatively minimal
requirements. Despite pressure from the Commission and the European Parliament, broader interpretations,
not only starting from a stronger focus on ex post data, but also considering other metrics, such as the share
of national emissions accounted for by monitored policies, have so far not been incorporated into the Monitor-
ing Mechanism. Limited reporting means that the Monitoring Mechanism may be unable to provide the data
needed to generate in-depth policy evaluations, but to date there has been no research on the extent to
which existing climate policy evaluations (see Huitema et al., 2011) draw on the EEA’s data.
Consistency
The Monitoring Mechanism’s Quality Analysis and Quality Control procedure (EEA, 2013, p. 14) provides a tech-
nical definition of consistency as follows:
Consistency means that reported information on policies and measures is internally consistent, including between years. Con-
sistency also relates to the reporting of information for analogous policies within the same sector, in different Member States.
Estimated emissions savings are consistent if the same methodologies are used for the base and all subsequent years, and if
consistent data sets are used to estimate emissions savings from all policies […]
The EEA’s report details inconsistencies in the 2011 data from seven Member States, such as reporting ‘zero’ for
both no emissions reductions and missing information (ETC/ACC, 2012). In order to shed further light on what a
broader interpretation of consistency might mean for reporting, we compared the number of policies reported
across the reporting cycles (see Figure 1).
Given significant experience with reporting on policies, one might expect to find a commensurate increase
and convergence in the number of policies. Instead, Figure 1 reveals considerable variation, with little conver-
gence over the three reporting cycles. The total number of policies reported rose from 1274 (2009) to 1397
(2011) and 1526 (2013).14 High levels of variation across and, perhaps most surprisingly, within Member
States suggest ongoing reporting inconsistencies, which have also been implicitly noted by the Commission’s
repeated publication of methodological guidelines (e.g. AEA, ECOFYS, Fraunhofer, & ICCS, 2009; Öko-Institut,
Cambridge Economics, AMEC, Harmelink Consulting, & TNO, 2012). In particular, low levels of ex post reporting
compromise efforts to increase consistency because there is little learning on what to report when only a few
countries provide such estimates.
The Monitoring Mechanism also misses other important policy dimensions associated with consistency. For
example, research has shown that technological innovation requires policy consistency (e.g. Blyth et al., 2007).
Yet without ex post evaluation, it is difficult to know if policies genuinely deliver. A much broader interpretation
of consistency could conceivably examine how particular policies contribute to global targets, as highlighted in
global emissions gap analyses (UNEP, 2014) and tracker exercises (Climate Analytics, ECOFYS, New Climate Insti-
tute, & PIK, 2015).
Comparability
The Monitoring Mechanism’s Quality Assurance and Quality Control procedure (EEA, 2013, p. 13) defines com-
parability to mean that ‘style and format of information reported on policies andmeasures is comparable among
Member States […]’. Data presented in the previous two sections indicate high levels of heterogeneity, which
restricts comparability. An additional way to understand implications for comparability is to consider reporting
information on effects across sectors (such as agriculture and energy). As Figure 2 shows, there is considerable
variation in reporting practice, with some Member States on average assigning nearly twice as many sectors per
policy than others. However, the data do not indicate in which sectors emissions reductions occur – that is, only
the ‘primary’ one of a policy or across multiple sectors? This omission severely hampers comparability.
There are also additional differences in the interpretation of what to report that impede comparability. For
example, the report on the 2011 submissions (ETC/ACC, 2012) highlighted diverging methodologies for ex ante
and ex post emissions estimates. But challenges may be even more fundamental: because the Monitoring
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Mechanism does not specify what a ‘measure’ is, Member States may have variously interpreted it as a single
policy instrument (be that a regulation, tax, or subsidy) or a package of instruments. The fact that the
number of policies reported (see Figure 1) and the sectors assigned to them vary significantly (Figure 2) suggests
that this may be inhibiting comparability.
Another issue arises over the geographical focus of policy monitoring. Consider, for example, the well-known
distinction between consumption and territorial emissions (e.g. Davis & Caldeira, 2010). Currently, reporting on
policies follows the logic of the emission inventory and provides only a territorial perspective (i.e. emissions gen-
erated within the borders of a country). This has limited the uptake of consumption-based monitoring, which is
politically and technically more demanding as it must combine comparable data across countries (both within
and outside the EU). EEA staff stressed that new formal requirements to include these (or indeed other
additional metrics) in the Monitoring Mechanism are unlikely as Member States generally oppose additional
‘reporting burdens’.
In principle, policies could also be evaluated in relation to their effect on carbon prices, energy prices/taxes, or
overall spending (Aldy & Pizer, 2015). In some cases, actors have pushed for alternative options; for example, the
Bush administration attempted to introduce (production-based) emission intensity indicators, because these do
not constrain emissions-driven economic growth (Aldy & Pizer, 2015). In short, comparing policies via indicators
is certainly not a ‘neutral’ activity because indicators always embody underlying values and (hence political)
choices (see Gudmundsson, 2003; Lehtonen, 2015).
The most common reasons for adopting a narrow framing of comparability relate to cost, the perceived use-
fulness of additional information, and ongoing resistance from Member States against providing more
Figure 1. Number of policies reported by Member State. Data source: EEA.
CLIMATE POLICY 5
comparative information on policies, lest this afford EU institutions too much control.15 Instructively, recent
attempts by the Commission to revise the Monitoring Mechanism led to contentious debates on alternative indi-
cators. The Commission’s proposal appeared on the CCC’s agenda four times,16 which according to our inter-
views17 indicates it was politically contentious.18 Our own analysis of the committee’s minutes suggests that
Member States fought to the very last meeting to remove some of the newly introduced climate-related finan-
cial reporting from the implementing legislation19 and to delay reporting deadlines. During the final debate20 in
the European Parliament, the Parliament’s Rapporteur, Bas Eickhout, identified Germany and the UK as the main
obstructers. Former climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard lamented that the frequency of reporting was
lower than she had hoped, but many Members of the European Parliament stressed the importance of minimiz-
ing additional administrative burdens. Thus, agreeing on a new monitoring system to improve comparability
was anything but straightforward.
Transparency
In the context of the Quality Assurance and Quality Control Procedure (EEA, 2013, p. 8), transparency mainly
refers to the source of monitoring information:
Figure 2. Average number of sectors assigned per policy. Data source: EEA.
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Transparency means that key information on policies and measures should be clearly identifiable. The assumptions and
methods used to estimate the emissions savings from policies should be clearly explained. The sources of all data used, including
any parameters reported, should be clear to users. […]
In order to shed further light on how the EU has interpreted this, we used the number of references to other
sources in qualitative and quantitative national submissions as a proxy measure of transparency, especially
because many reports are too brief to assess methods and assumptions in depth. As Figure 3 details, the
majority of Member States provide a relatively low number of references (1–20) in their submissions.22 There
are, however, a few notable outliers. Finland, for example, provided no references whatsoever across three
reporting cycles. By contrast, Germany provided a consistently large number of references. A little over a
third of Member States provided reference lists in their qualitative submissions,23 with Germany again being
a prominent example. By contrast, the UK and Spain provided no reference lists at all. Thus, Figure 3 reveals
that on this particular measure, countries interpret transparency differently.
In addition to these essentially technical issues, the EEA has also endeavoured to increase general reporting
transparency through improving the usability and accessibility of the data.24 This has mainly been done through
improving the EEA’s database on mitigation policies.25 However, retrieving Member State submissions from the
public European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET) website26 is still challenging,
requiring a detailed knowledge of specific reporting obligations. The EEA’s repository lists some submissions
more than once, or in different versions, and some are not available or locked for countries that have chosen
not to make their reports publically available.27
Finally, transparency also implies that someone actually uses these data. The EEA staff stressed that they per-
ceive policy makers to be the main users of the Monitoring Mechanism,28 but they lamented low interest among
academics.29
Discussion and conclusions
One of the key features of the Paris Agreement is the new transparency mechanism to track progress every five
years (Article 13). Because many countries will rely on public policies to deliver on their NDCs, reporting will need
Figure 3. Frequency of countries per reference number category. Data sources: EEA and EIONET.21
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to include information on policy performance. This study draws on the EU’s long and, for the most part, unex-
plored experience with climate policy monitoring to gauge what challenges lie ahead for effective monitoring in
the UNFCCC after Paris.
What lessons emerge from the EU’s experience? The first thing to note is that the Monitoring Mechanism has
evolved in a situation of relatively high institutional trust and political buy-in; that is, the EU is a system where
some aspects of reporting can be legally enforced and hence is a ‘more likely’ case of sophisticated policy moni-
toring. But even in this relatively propitious context, the Commission and the EEA have had to operate under
considerable political and technical constraints. The strong imbalance between ex ante projections and ex
post reporting is especially instructive. This imbalance is in line with issues in other ‘policy tracking’ initiatives
(Fransen & Cronin, 2013). It strongly suggests that the persistent challenges in the EU are likely to emerge –
perhaps even in an exacerbated form – in other fora, notably in the UNFCCC, where levels of trust and
cooperation are much lower and countries retain greater control over national climate policy target-setting
and monitoring. The EU’s experience of governing monitoring suggests that the UNFCCC must likely expend
significant and sustained political effort to address these challenges.
Second, our results reveal that there is an important interaction between the EU’s internal monitoring activi-
ties and international developments. The international influence has contributed to the deeply path-dependent,
emissions-centred understanding of EU policy monitoring, which originated from the IPCC’s efforts to track GHG
fluxes. Our findings suggest that this partly hampers the generation of more comprehensive knowledge on
specific policy performance (see also Yamin & Depledge, 2004, Chapter 11), including the difference between
territorial and consumption emissions. With time this may, however, change as the Paris Agreement recognizes
that ‘sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production,… play an important role in
addressing climate change’ (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 20). Agreeing upon new review practices in the Paris transparency
mechanism is likely to be very challenging.
Third, it is curious how something seemingly so technical as monitoring appears, with the benefit of hind-
sight, to have been so deeply contentious. Conflict has flared not only over ‘administrative burdens’, but also
over issues in relation to who should monitor climate policy and the perceived usefulness of different types
of monitoring data. There is an ongoing struggle to coordinate national monitoring systems that are at very
different stages of development. In the EU, the very name ‘Monitoring Mechanism’ seemed suitably anodyne
– a topic that could be pigeonholed in the category of mere technicalities. This may explain why scholars
have so far paid little attention to policy monitoring in the EU. While Paris may have established the base for
new monitoring institutions and procedures at the international level, the technicalities and politics of monitor-
ing in practice are likely to remain contentious.
Fourth, focusing on emissions implicitly contains a normative vision that absolute emissions reductions
within a country matter much more than other policy effects, including effects on, for example, consumption.
Our results reveal that an approach borrowed from measuring fluxes of GHGs remains narrow when applied
to specific policies. When the main purpose is checking data for a central database, the criteria of complete, con-
sistent, comparable, and transparent information advance limited learning. The resulting information largely
fails to reflect complex political choices that arise from systems of sovereign (i.e. state) decision making. The
EU’s interpretation thus misses an opportunity to engage in climate leadership.
Our findings suggest that the technical focus, coupled with the fact that the Mechanism functions in an
essentially bottom-up manner, has led individual Member States to interpret reporting requirements very dif-
ferently. The result has been, despite the criteria, highly heterogeneous data that are difficult to compare
across countries and over time without substantial additional information. If replicated at the wider, inter-
national level (and in related fields, such as private climate governance – see Widerberg & Stripple, 2016),
such features of the data will make it difficult to gauge the size of national contributions to limit climate
change in accordance with the Paris Agreement, let alone judge the relative importance of policy versus
non-policy effects. One way to address this might be for the UNFCCC to reframe monitoring from being
a routine collection of information on compliance to become an exercise in generating policy learning and
insight.
New research on EU monitoring could support the emerging international climate governance system. First,
the qualitative country submissions to the Monitoring Mechanism could be analysed in more detail. An in-depth
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analysis of the views of Member States involved in preparing the submissions could support identifying incen-
tives for better reporting. This would help identify potential strategies to harmonize submissions and thus
increase comparability and transparency. Second, if data quality on climate policies and measures did
improve, the Monitoring Mechanism could in turn facilitate deeper evaluation work in order to support con-
clusions by tracking exercises on why progress is being made (or not – see also Jordan et al., 2015). For
example, what are the common characteristics of the most effective policies? Are countries that report more
policies better at reducing their emissions and what are the most significant policies in terms of GHG reductions
and other effects (see Hildén et al., 2014)? Third, the implementation of the new Monitoring Mechanism – start-
ing with the most recent (2015) data –merits careful analysis, particularly with a view to checking if the quality of
reporting has evolved. It would also be useful to study how newer Member States and accession states (which
are generally perceived to have much weaker evaluative capacities – see Furubo, Rist, & Sandahl, 2002) are enga-
ging. Such an analysis might offer some useful insights into understanding the challenges that even poorer
countries may encounter after Paris.30
We conclude that some of the high hopes vested in bottom-up governance may be based on a range of less
commonly addressed but potentially problematic assumptions, not least in relation to the capacities and politi-
cal desire to undertake monitoring and evaluation. Many of the political challenges identified by Thompson
(2006) a decade ago appear to persist even in the EU – a self-declared climate leader with one of the most
advanced systems for climate policy monitoring. These include the ability and willingness of political actors
to provide information on policies, which at present even in the EU appears to be severely limited. But other
contexts can also provide helpful lessons on monitoring for the UNFCCC, as we have shown by drawing on
the US-based discussion on similar issues (e.g. Aldy, 2014; Aldy & Pizer, 2015; Aldy et al., 2016; Feldman &
Wilt, 1996). Looking forward, a key question is what governance innovations (Jordan & Huitema, 2014) may
move countries to monitor and evaluate their policies more effectively. A starting point may be the growing
interest in national climate policy (Jordan et al., 2015), reflecting interest group pressure and a deeper
concern with policy effectiveness.
Ultimately, the implementation of the Paris Agreement will hinge on whether political actors can successfully
navigate these monitoring challenges. The EU’s experience shows that incorporating policies into NDCs should
be seen as only one step in a long journey towards better knowledge of climate policies, requiring ongoing pol-
itical and administrative support, both at the national and the international level.
Notes
1. One EEA staff member described the system as ‘best in class’ compared to other policy sectors (Interview 2, 11 May 2015).
2. See Thompson (2006) on the lack of climate policy monitoring at the international level.
3. A fifth criterion, accuracy, has been excluded from this analysis, given the highly technical discussion in this area. The EEA
assesses accuracy by comparing data from different countries.
4. See, for example, UNFCCC COP Report, 17th Session, Durban, November–December 2011, p. 5.
5. Earlier reporting focused mainly on national-level GHG emissions and not policies.
6. CCC minutes, 21–22 March 2005: the Commission was ‘determined to use infringement procedures’ to enforce reporting.
7. Cases C-61/07 (17 July 2007) and C-390/08 (14 May 2009).
8. Interview 1, EEA Staff, 11 May 2015.
9. The CCC minutes from 23 to 24 March 2004, detail patchy/late reporting and differences among Member States.
10. Only five countries drove the slight rise in ex post quantification in 2013: Belgium (57%), Finland (16%), the UK (11%), Slovenia
(3%), and France (1%).
11. Interview 4, EEA Staff, 13 May 2015.
12. Interview 4, EEA Staff, 13 May 2015.
13. Interview 2, EEA Staff, 11 May 2015.
14. Switzerland only reported in 2013 and was excluded.
15. Interview 2, EEA Staff, 11 May 2015.
16. Sessions 64, 77, 78, 79.
17. Interview 3, EEA Staff, 13 May 2015.
18. Purely technical issues are often resolved at the working group level.
19. According to CCC Session 79 minutes, they ultimately failed to do so.
20. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getVod.do?mode=chapter&language=EN&vodDateId=20130311-21:23:04-627.
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21. http://rod.eionet.europa.eu/obligations/696/overview.
22. Reports not included (not available/in national language – 16% of the reports): France; the Netherlands; Latvia 2009; Poland
2013; Portugal 2013; Slovakia 2011; Slovenia 2011; Slovenia 2013; UK 2013. In-text and listed references were included (only
identifiable documents); legislation and policy strategies were not included. Given high levels of inconsistency, figures are
indicative only.
23. Similar in fact to a journal article.
24. Interviews 3–5, EEA Staff, 13 May 2015.
25. http://pam.apps.eea.europa.eu/.
26. http://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/.
27. See also Note 23.
28. Interview 1, EEA Staff, 11 May 2015.
29. Interview 1, EEA Staff, 11 May 2015.
30. We are grateful to Ekaterina Domorenok, who helpfully made this point during the 2015 UACES Annual Conference in Bilbao.
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